












Conventional	 wisdom	 suggests	 that	 a	 strong	 legislature	 is	 built	 on	 a	 strong	 internal	
committee	system,	both	in	terms	of	committee	powers	and	the	willingness	of	members	to	
engage	 in	 committee	work.	 Committee	 assignments	 are	 the	 behavioural	manifestation	of	
legislative	 organisation.	 Despite	 this,	 much	 remains	 unknown	 about	 how	 committee	
assignments	happen	and	with	what	causes	and	consequences.	Our	focus	in	this	article	is	on	
providing	 the	 context	 for,	 and	 introducing	 new	 research	 on,	 what	 we	 call	 the	 political	







	Parliamentary	 committees	 can	 play	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 aggregating	 legislators’	 preferences,	
processing	 proposed	 legislation,	 and	 holding	 the	 executive	 to	 account.	 All	 legislative	
assemblies	‘work	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	through	committees’	(Laundy,	1989,	p.	96).	At	
least	 since	Woodrow	Wilson’s	 canonical	 observation,	 ‘Congress	 in	 session	 is	 Congress	 on	
public	 exhibition,	 whilst	 Congress	 in	 its	 committee-rooms	 is	 Congress	 at	 work’	 (Wilson,	
1885,	 p.	 69),	 scholars	 have	 sought	 to	 understand	 the	 origins,	 design,	 role,	 and	 impact	 of	
legislative	committees.		
	
Across	 legislatures,	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	 large	variation	 in	how	committee	systems	are	
established.	Some	committee	systems	have	extensive	drafting	authority	and	agenda	control	
(comparative	 studies	 of	 formal	 institutional	 characteristics	 include	 André,	 Depauw,	 and	
Martin,	2016;	Martin,	2011;	Mickler,	2017;	Strøm,	1998;	Yläoutinen	and	Hallerberg,	2008;	
Zubek,	 2015).	A	 strong	 committee	 system	 is	 typically	 seen	as	 a	necessary	 if	 not	 sufficient	
condition	 for	 the	 legislature	 to	 operate	 effectively	 in	 terms	 of	 influencing	 the	 legislative	
process	and	holding	the	executive	to	account	(Strøm,	1990).		
	
This	 article,	 and	 the	 articles	 that	 follow,	 explore	 the	 politics	 of	 committee	 assignments.	
Committee	 assignments	 are	 the	 behavioural	 manifestation	 of	 legislative	 organisation,	 a	
process	by	which	‘resources	and	parliamentary	rights	[are	assigned]	to	individual	legislators	
or	groups	of	legislators’	(Krehbiel,	1992,	p.	2).	Our	specific	focus	is	on	understanding	which	
members	 sit	 in	 which	 committees,	 why,	 and	 with	 what	 consequences.	 As	 Rohde	 and	
Shepsle	 (1973,	 p.	 889)	 noted	 over	 45	 years	 ago,	 understanding	 the	 ‘process	 by	 which	
members	 are	 assigned	 to	 committees	 is	 of	 the	 greatest	 importance.’	 Despite	 this,	 much	
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remains	 unknown	 about	 how	 committee	 assignments	 happen	 and	with	what	 causes	 and	
consequences.		
	
The	 literature	 on	 committee	 assignments	 is	 characterised	 by	 two	 distinctive	 research	
‘traditions‘.	One	tradition	relates	 to	US	Congressional	 studies	 (Martin,	2014a).	The	debate	
within	 this	 tradition	 revolves	around	 the	question	of	whether	committee	assignments	are	




Extending	 our	 knowledge	 about	 committee	 assignments	 to	 other	 legislatures	 is	 of	 crucial	
importance.	Exploring	committee	assignments	outside	the	US	case	allow	us	to	analyse	how	
two	 of	 the	 most	 central	 institutions	 and	 pivotal	 elements	 in	 legislative	 politics–	
parliamentary	parties	and	parliamentary	committees	–	interact.	Indeed,	understanding	the	
causes	and	consequences	of	committee	assignment	patterns	in	a	legislature	illuminates	the	
fundamental	 motivations	 of	 political	 elites.	 In	 other	 words,	 understanding	 committee	
assignments	 helps	 us	 understand	 if	 politicians,	 and	 the	 political	 parties	 to	 which	 they	
belong,	 are	 interested	 in	 policy,	 office	 or	 votes	 –	 or	 some	mix	 (Martin	 2016;	Müller	 and	
Strøm	1999).		
	






assignments	 offers	 an	 important	 stepping	 stone	 to	 better	 understand	 decision-making	
processes	and	power	 relations	within	modern	 legislatures.	Although	parliamentary	parties	
are,	 in	 many	 legislatures,	 the	 dominating	 organisational	 structures	 (Damgaard,	 1995;	
Saalfeld	and	Strøm,	2014)	compared	to	committees,	committees	nevertheless	constitute	a	
central	 venue	 for	 political	 actors.	 Parliamentary	 procedures	 affect	 political	 outcomes.	We	
know	that	many	parliamentary	parties	 rely	on	a	process	of	 internal	division	of	 labour	and	
delegate	 the	 task	 to	 develop	 policy	 proposals	 to	 specific	 policy	 experts	 in	 committees	 –	
Japan’s	 LDP	being	 a	 classic	 example	 (Saalfeld	 and	 Strøm,	 2014).	 Committee	members	 are	
privileged	 in	the	sense	that	 they	are	able	to	work	on	policy	 issues	within	the	committee’s	
jurisdiction	 before	 other	 legislators	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 do	 so.	 Having	 the	 ’wrong’	
legislator	on	a	committee,	therefore,	risks	to	produce	outcomes	with	detrimental	effects	for	
the	 parliamentary	 party.	 Additionally,	 an	 enhanced	 knowledge	 of	 committee	 assignments	
opens	 up	 new	 and	 fascinating	 research	 questions	 about	 the	 further	 implications	 of	 the	









example,	 the	 consequences	 of	 parliamentary	 versus	 presidentialism	 and	 the	 impact	 of	
electoral	 systems	 on	 political	 behaviour).	 A	 major	 source	 of	 contention	 in	 the	 scholarly	
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literature	 is	 the	application	and	appropriateness	of	 the	so-called	congressional	 framework	
of	legislative	organisation.	While	the	concepts	derived	from	US	congressional	theories	prove	
to	 be	 helpful,	 at	 least	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 to	 understand	 politicians’	 motivations	 and	









With	 important	 exceptions,	 the	 theoretical	 treatment	 of	 the	 process	 of	 legislative	
organisation	-	of	which	committees	are	a	central	feature	-	is	still	structured	largely	in	terms	
of	 three	distinctive	perspectives	 that	were	developed	 to	 study	 the	US	Congress.	Although	
the	 three	 perspectives	were	mainly	 produced	 in	 the	 ‘golden	 era’	 of	 studies	 of	 legislative	




















economically	 inefficient,	 geographically	 targeted,	 projects.	 A	 key	 strategy	 of	 legislators	 to	
achieve	 this	 is	 trading	 their	 own	 votes	 on	 issues	 which	 are	 not	 important	 to	 their	






to	 support	 a	 policy	 and	 little	 control	 over	 the	 successful	 passing	 of	 this	 proposal,	 a	
‘deadlock’	 is	 unavoidable.	 Black	 (1948)	 showed	 that	 a	 stable	 outcome	 is	 unlikely	 when	
complex	 issues	 must	 be	 solved	 via	 majority	 voting.	 Similarly,	 Arrow	 (1951)	 argued	 that	
political	outcomes	are	inherently	unstable	with	simple	majority	rules.	Agreements	between	





The	 enforcement	 problem	 follows	 from	 the	 time-lapse	 of	 log-rolling	 bargains	 between	
legislators.	 After	 engaging	 in	 log-rolling	 and	exchanging	 votes,	 legislators	 fear	 prospective	
defection.	Support	for	a	bill	in	exchange	for	future	support	by	the	other	legislator	creates	a	
moral	 hazard	 problem.	 As	 Weingast	 and	 Marshall	 (1988,	 p.	 140)	 note,	 the	 	 ‘public	




By	 dividing	 policy	 areas,	 committees	 create	 a	 decentralised	 agenda	 control	 system.	 This	
gives	interested	legislators	a	chance	to	join	their	respective	field	and	‘cluster’	in	committees.	
The	committee	system	provides	substantial	protection	against	opportunistic	behaviour	and	
enables	 legislators	 to	 facilitate	 gains	 from	 trade.	 The	 collective	 legislative	 instability	 is	
‘stabilised’	 by	 institutionalizing	 bargains	 between	 their	members	 (see	 e.g.	 Tullock,	 1981),	








be	 highly	 unrepresentative	 of	 their	 parent	 body	 and	 ‘committee	 members‘	 preferences	





projects;	 welfare	 committees	 by	 congressmen	 with	 poor	 constituents;	 and	 defence	
committees	by	congressmen	with	significant	defence	contractors	or	defence	installations	in	





2014a,	 p.	 355)	 of	 the	 stability	 of	 Congress.	 It	 views	 committees	 as	 autonomous	 power	
centers	with	an	exceptional	status	and	gate-keeping	power.	This	‘textbook	view	of	Congress’	
was	the	dominant	theme	in	congressional	studies	for	over	a	decade,	remained	conventional	





from	 the	 same	 paradigm	 as	 the	 distributional	 theory,	 namely	 the	 perspective	 of	 rational	
choice	 institutionalism.	 But	 the	 informational	 theory	 fundamentally	 challenges	 the	













Committees	 are	 viewed	 as	 the	 prime	 organisational	 means	 to	 provide	 the	 possibility	 for	
specialised	 information	 to	 reduce	 the	 uncertainty	 regarding	 legislation	 and	 minimise	
unintended	policy	outcomes.	From	the	 informational	perspective,	membership	working	 in	
committees	 provides	 a	 collective	benefit.	 Committees	 do	not	 just	 allow	more	work	 to	 be	
done	 –	 they	 allow	 members’	 specialisation	 to	 accumulate	 informational	 advantages	 and	
tacit	knowledge	resulting	in	better	legislative	activities	of	benefit	to	the	entire	chamber.	This	
organisational	 advantage	 of	 committees	 is	 not	 only	 characteristic	 of	 legislatures:	 Any	
organisation	 can	 benefit	 from	 creating	 a	 sub-unit	 in	 which	 members	 specialise.	
Consequently,	almost	immediately,	the	workload	of	the	assembly	can	increase	dramatically	
as	 the	 plenary	 bottleneck	 succumbs	 to	 committees’	 working	 simultaneously,	 thereby	
exponentially	increasing	the	possible	workload	and	output	of	legislatures.		
	
Gilligan	 and	 Krehbiel	 (1990)	 model	 the	 legislative	 process	 as	 a	 two	 person-game	 under	
incomplete	 information	 between	 a	 standing	 committee	 and	 the	 entire	 legislature.	 They	
conclude	 that	 reduction	of	uncertainty	 in	mostly	new	and	untried	policies	 is	 unanimously	
valued	by	risk-averse	legislators.	It	is	argued	that	specialisation	of	committee	members	is	a	
necessary	condition	to	enhance	informational	efficiency,	but	 it	also	provides	opportunities	
for	strategic	use	of	 this	expertise.	Within	a	game	of	asymmetric	 information,	 in	which	the	
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committee	 is	 better	 informed	 than	 the	 legislature,	 the	 floor	 has	 no	 incentive	 to	 ever	
adopting	a	bill	which	comes	out	of	a	committee	(see	Gilligan	and	Krehbiel,	1990,	p.	547),	if	
the	committee	does	not	reflect	the	preferences	of	the	chamber.	Even	when	a	committee’s	
preference	differs	only	marginally	 from	 that	of	 the	 legislature,	 the	plenum	can	 ‘no	 longer	
rationally	believe	the	committee’s	bill	will	yield	the	legislature’s	ideal	point’	(see	Gilligan	and	
Krehbiel,	 1990,	 p.	 547).	 As	 a	matter	 of	 prudence,	 a	 rational	 legislature	 anticipates	 these	
unwanted	 consequences.	 The	 legislature	 is	 assumed	 to	 carefully	 ‘balance	 resources	 with	
preferences,	concerns,	knowing	that	each	has	implications	for	capturing	collective	benefits	
from	 informative	 committees	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 uncertainty’	 (see	 Gilligan	 and	 Krehbiel,	




2.3	 The	 Partisan	 Theory:	 Committees	 Controlled	 by	 the	 Parliamentary	 Party	 Group	
Leadership?		
Both	 the	distributive	and	 informational	 theories	of	 legislative	organisation	place	emphasis	
on	 individual	 members’	 interests	 and	 abilities	 to	 shape	 the	 committee	 system.	 Despite	
being	 contradictory	 in	 their	 predictions,	 both	 share	 one	 assumption:	 The	 absence	 of	
partisan	organisation	as	major	force	in	the	organisation	of	the	US	Congress.	This	assumption	
followed	 the	 general	 perception	 of	 parties	 in	 the	 political	 system	 of	 the	 US	 as	 ‘empty	
vessels’	(Katz	and	Kolodny,	1994).		
	




the	observable	work	of	 Congress	 is	 undertaken	within	 and	between	 committees,	 political	
parties	 nevertheless	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 by	 shaping	 the	 committee	 system	 and	 committee	
activities.	For	Cox	and	McCubbins,	the	structuring	of	the	system	by	political	parties	assists	
the	party’s	leadership	by	cartelizing	legislative	power.	The	committee	system,	far	from	being	










that	 ‘members’	 preferences	 for	 assignment	 are	 important	 and	 determine	 much	 of	 the	
pattern	 of	 actual	 assignment’	 (Cox	 and	 McCubbins,	 1993,	 p.	 186).	 Their	 analysis	 of	




and	 punish	members	 who	 have	 defied	 the	 leadership	 during	 roll-call	 votes.	 The	 effect	 is	
present	 in	 their	 analysis	 on	 initial	 assignments	 as	 well	 as	 for	 switched	 assignments	














Hamm,	Hedlund	and	Post,	2011).	The	variety	of	 state	 legislatures	has	 further	complicated	
the	task,	as	theories	have	been	reinterpreted	and	altered.	
	
Some	 studies	 have	 found	 evidence	 in	 line	with	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	 distributive	 theory	
(Masters,	1961;	Fenno,	1966;	Shepsle	and	Weingast,	1981;	Niou	and	Ordeshook,	1985;	Hall	
and	Grofman,	1990),	especially	when	taking	into	consideration	constituency	characteristics	
and	whether	 they	match	with	 the	 committee	 of	 the	 legislator	 (Adler	 and	 Lapinski,	 1997;	
Adler,	2000;	Frisch	and	Kelly,	2004).	Based	on	committee	 request	data	 to	 the	Democratic	
Committee	on	Committees	in	the	86th-88th	and	90th	Congresses,	Rohde	and	Shepsle	(1973,	
p.	895)	conclude	that	there	is	‘a	clear	relationship	between	the	type	of	district	represented	
and	 the	 committees	 most	 requested’.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 composition	 of	 ten	 House	













unchallenged.	 The	 distributive	 theory	 faced	 more	 empirical	 challenges	 from	 the	
informational	or	partisan	perspective.	Scholars	were	unable	to	provide	coherent	empirical	
proof	of	a	 systematic	and	significant	difference	of	preferences	of	 legislators	 in	committee	
compared	 to	 the	 floor.	 Krehbiel	 (1990,	 p.	 150)	 argued	 that	 the	 evidence	 for	 ‘“preference	





majority	 of	 committees	 are	 composed	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 they	 are	 representative	 of	 the	
floor	(see	also	Overby,	Kazee,	and	Prince,	2004;	Prince	and	Overby,	2005).	Data	by	Hamm,	
Hedlund,	and	Post	(2011)	indicate	that	members	who	possess	advantageous	policy-relevant	








2009;	 Kanthak,	 2009;	 Mooney,	 2013).	 Studies	 which	 supported	 the	 informational	 and	
distributive	theories	systematically	downplayed	the	role	of	 legislative	parties.	Yet,	partisan	
considerations	were	 demonstrated	 in	 numerous	 studies	 (e.g.	Hedlund	 and	Hamm,	 1996).	
Findings	by	Carsey	and	Rundquist	(1999,	p.	1167)	are	consistent	with	the	general	argument	
inspired	 by	 Cox	 and	 McCubbins	 and	 conclude	 ‘that	 the	 majority	 party	 organises	 the	
committee	system	so	as	to	benefit	its	members’	constituencies’.	Kanthak	(2009)	concludes	










Research	 on	 committees	 outside	 the	 US	 initially	 focused	 primarily	 on	 the	 European	




favouring	 the	party-cartel	perspective.	Bowler	and	Farrell	 (1995)	also	 find	 support	 for	 the	







In	 contrast,	 Whitaker	 (2001,	 2011)	 focused	 on	 the	 assignment	 process	 and	 the	 level	 of	
influence	of	political	group	leaders,		concluding	that	‘most	members	are	able	to	self-select	
their	 committee	 positions	 and	 many	 do	 so	 primarily	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 own	 policy	






distributive	potential	 tend	to	consist	of	 ’high-demanding’	preferential	outliers.	 In	contrast,	
education	 and	 professional	 expertise	 matter	 more	 in	 information-driven	 committees,	 as	
predicted	 by	 the	 informational	 perspective.	 Some	 of	 these	 findings	 contradict	 earlier	
research	as	there	is,	e.g.	no	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	MEPs	with	trade	union	ties	join	









committee	 assignments).	 Committees	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament	 was	 therefore	
characterised	as	being	’in	need	of	a	theory’	(Yordanova,	2011).	
	




electoral	 rules	 or	 candidate	 selection	 procedures	 (Cain,	 Ferejohn	 and	 Fiorina,	 1987;	
Stratmann	 and	 Baur,	 2002;	 Pekkanen,	 Nyblade	 and	 Krauss,	 2006;	 Crisp	 et	 al.,	 2009;	
Gschwend	and	Zittel,	 2016).	 Stratmann	and	Baur	 (2002)	 analyse	 the	effects	of	Germany’s	
mixed	member	system	on	committee	assignments.	They	argue	that	nominally	elected	MPs	
are	strategically	assigned	to	different	committees	than	their	colleagues	which	entered	the	
Bundestag	 by	 a	 party	 list.	 By	 assigning	 them	 to	 those	 committees	 which	 allow	 them	 to	
please	their	local	constituents	the	parliamentary	party	groups	hope	for	electoral	benefits	at	
the	 next	 election.	 Their	 results	 show	 that	 committees	 which	 allow	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	
benefits	 to	 their	 geographic	 re-election	 constituency	 are	 stacked	 with	 nominally	 elected	
legislators	 while	 committees	 which	 control	 funds	 that	 benefit	 their	 party’s	 re-election	
constituencies	are	disproportionally	filled	with	legislators	which	entered	the	Bundestag	by	a	
party	 list	 (Stratmann	 and	 Baur,	 2002,	 p.	 513).	 Looking	 further	 at	 the	 German	 case,	
Gschwend	and	Zittel	(2016)	find	that	legislators	with	local	ties	are	more	likely	to	be	assigned	






legislators	 and	 committee	 assignments	 (Gschwend	 and	 Zittel,	 2016)	 was	 provided	 by	
Mickler	 (2013;	 2017).	 However,	 his	 studies	 also	 highlighted	 additional	 influences	 on	
committee	 assignments:	 First,	 a	 strong	 adherence	 to	 a	 seniority	 principle	which	 provides	
incumbent	 legislators	with	a	relatively	strong	claim	to	stay	on	a	committee.	Second,	many	
assignments	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 legislators’	 external	 interests	 and	 advantageous	 policy-
relevant	 knowledge	 greatly	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 to	 be	 assigned	 to	 a	 corresponding	
committee.	Additionally,	 the	assignment	process	 is	structured	by	country-specific	patterns	
such	 as	 the	 influence	of	 the	 regional	 factions	 of	 the	 larger	 parliamentary	 parties	 and,	 for	





Ciftci,	 Forrest	 and	 Tekin	 (2008)	 explore	 the	 Turkish	 case,	 finding	 evidence	 that	 policy	











period	 of	 1982	 and	 2010	 as	 well	 as	 the	 assignment	 to	 important	 committees	 in	 two	
multivariate	models.	Although	some	patterns	are	found,	most	notably	with	regard	to	sector	
knowledge	 (Hansen,	 2011,	 p.	 354),	 the	 author	 concludes	 that	 ’the	 results	 point	 towards	
committee	assignments	in	Dáil	Éireann	happening	rather	randomly’	(Hansen,	2011,	p.	346).	
However,	 a	 more	 recent	 study	 of	 assignments	 in	 the	 Dáil,	 which	 relies	 on	 a	 statistical	
analysis	of	assignments	and	interviews	with	legislatures,	concludes	that	the	assignments	can	
be	described	by	a	mixture	of	reoccurring	and	stable	factors	(Mickler,	2017b).	Although	there	
was	 hardly	 any	 evidence	 of	 partisan	 influences,	 advantageous	 policy-relevant	 knowledge	
corresponding	 to	 a	 committee’s	 jurisdiction	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 legislator	 to	 be	
assigned	 to	 a	 corresponding	 committee.	 Additionally,	 the	 interviews	 with	 legislators	
highlighted	 factors	 ascribed	 to	 the	 distributive	 rationale,	 at	 least	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
assignments.	 Raymond	 and	 Holt	 (2014)	 find	 that	 distributive	 and	 partisan	 models	 of	
legislative	organisation	explain	committee	assignments	in	Canada.	Additional	studies	which	
focus	on	committee	chair	assignments	and	the	extent	to	which	committee	chairs	from	one	





The	 six	 papers	 that	 follow	 attempt	 to	 shed	 new	 light	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 committee	













Dutch	 Tweede	 Kamer	 –	 using	 quantitative	 analysis	 and	 elite	 interviews	 -	 provides	 us	 a	





Giannetti	 et	 al.	 (this	 issue)	 explore	 committee	 assignment	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 Italian	 legislators’	 desires	 to	 become	members	 of	 certain	 committees	 are	 fulfilled.	
Using	 original	 survey	 data	 on	 elected	 candidates,	 they	 suggest	 that	 that	 individual	
preferences	driven	by	distributive	interests	are	more	likely	to	be	accommodated	in	the	case	
of	 legislators	who	are	close	to	their	party	 in	policy	preference	terms.	 Ideological	proximity	




assignments	 to	 date,	 Raymond	 and	 Holt	 (this	 issue)	 explore	 committee	 assignments	 to 
committees whose remits include agricultural issues across 29 different legislatures. Their 
results suggest that constituency preferences impact committee selection in a wide range of 




Focusing	 on	 the	 European	 Parliament,	Whitaker	 (this	 issue)	 provides	 the	 first	 systematic	
assessment	 of	 how	 far	 Members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (MEPs)	 are	 successful	 in	
obtaining	places	on	 the	 committees	 to	which	 they	most	want	 to	be	assigned.	 The	 results	
indicate	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 success	 for	MEPs	 in	 achieving	 the	 committee	 assignments	 they	











a	 form	 of	 mega-seat	 (Martin	 2014b),	 committee	 chairs	 can	 be	 particularly	 important	
positions	 in	 legislatures.	 In	an	extension	of	 the	party-cartel	model,	 this	article	argues	 that	
party	 leadership	assigns	 legislators	with	 low	electoral	 vulnerability	 to	 committee	chairs	 to	
buy	 their	 loyalty	 to	 the	party.	Their	analysis	of	 committee	chair	assignments	 in	Spain	and	
Ireland	 suggest	 that	 those	 legislators	 are	 assigned	 to	 committee	 chairs	 to	 heighten	 their	
willingness	to	work	for	partisan	public	goods.		
	
Hansen	 (this	 issue)	 explores	 the	 importance	 of	 government	 formation	 to	 committee	
assignment	 politics	 in	 parliamentary	 systems.	 After	 all,	 a	 key	 role	 of	 legislatures	 in	
parliamentary	 systems	 –	 as	 contrasted	 to	 presidential	 systems	 –	 is	 the	 selection	 of	 the	






The	 study	 of	 committee	 assignments	 focuses	 on	 a	 relatively	 straightforward	 question	 by	
asking	‘who	gets	what?’	Yet,	answers	to	this	question	provide	much	insight	into	the	working	
of	 legislative	 assemblies.	 Understanding	 committee	 assignments	 allows	 us	 to	 make	




members	 vis	 á	 vis	 their	 parliamentary	 party	 and	 the	 autonomy	 of	 committee	 members	
during	 the	 policy-making	 process.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	 no	 surprise	 that	 this	 question	 has	
attracted	 considerable	 scholarly	 attention,	 most	 notably	 in	 the	 US	 Congress.	 In	 a	 lively	




to	 the	US	 theories.	 As	 a	 consequence,	most	 European	 studies	 of	 committee	 assignments	
rely	 on	 congressional	 theories	 of	 legislative	 organisation	 for	 their	 theoretical	 motivation.	
One	 might	 view	 this	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 the	 congressional	 theories	 as	 a	 weakness	 of	 the	
existing	analyses.	There	is	an	ongoing	debate	about	the	(non)-usefulness	of	the	theories	for	
understanding	other	cases	than	the	legislature	for	which	they	were	developed	-	which	might	
indeed	 be	 a	 ‘deviant	 case’	 (Shaw,	 1979,	 p.	 387)	 in	 many	 respects.	 Although	 this	 debate	




studies	 of	 other	 legislatures	 usually	 do	 not	 simply	 transfer	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	
congressional	 framework	 directly	 but	 rely	 on	 adapted	 versions	 of	 those	 theories.	 Most	
fundamentally,	 existing	 scholarly	 research	 outside	 of	 the	US	 setting	 usually	 redefines	 the	
role	 of	 legislative	 parties	 and	 views	 them	 as	 important	 actors	 with	 regard	 to	 committee	
assignments	 (see	 Fernandes,	 2016;	 Hansen,	 2016	 for	 similar	 arguments).	 While	 the	
congressional	debate	is	a	more	fundamental	one	and	centres	around	the	question	whether	
partisan	forces	constrain	 individual	 legislators	or	not,	this	question	 is	arguably	superfluous	
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in	 the	 party-centred	 context	 of	 many	 national	 legislatures	 (including,	 arguably,	 the	
European	Parliament).		
	
Scholars	 usually	 (more	 or	 less	 explicit)	 assume	 Müller's	 (2000,	 p.	 316)	 understanding	 of	
parties	in	the	European	context:	‘no	one	would	seriously	consider	any	alternative	to	political	
parties	 as	 the	 most	 important	 political	 coordination	 mechanism’.	 Subsequently,	 most	
studies	 of	 legislative	 organisation	 and	 committee	 assignments	 view	 legislative	 parties	 as	
important	 gatekeepers	 (thus	 circumventing	 the	 fundamental	 debate	 of	 ‘do	 parties	
matter?’).	In	this	sense,	the	partisan	theory	by	Cox	and	McCubbins	(2007,	p.	17)	is	‘correct’	
in	 its	 premise	 that	 committees	 are	 not	 autonomous.	 There	 will	 be	 no	 pure	 ‘committee	
government’,	 no	 self-selection	 with	 legislators’	 preferences	 being	 the	 sole	 decisive	
determinant	of	assignments.	However,	this	does	not	make	the	further	empirical	implications	
of	 the	partisan	 theory	correct	by	default.	When	premising	 the	supremacy	of	party	groups	
over	 committees,	 the	 organisational	 implications	 of	 the	 distributive	 and	 informational	
theory	 provide	 perfectly	 valid	 strategies	 for	 legislative	 parties.	 It	 can	 be	 tested	 whether	
parliamentary	party	groups	organise	 their	work	 in	 committees	according	 to	a	distributive,	
informational	 or	 partisan	 rationale	 (i.e.	 test	 the	 effect	 of	 relevant	 knowledge	 in	 a	
committee’s	 jurisdiction	 or	 more	 experience	 on	 being	 assigned	 to	 committees),	 thus	
providing	 a	 much	 more	 nuanced	 account	 of	 the	 complex	 assignment	 process.	 Especially	
with	regard	to	distributive	rationales	one	might	ask	why	strong	parliamentary	party	groups	
would	 allow	 for	 legislators	 to	 cater	 to	 external	 interests.	 However,	 even	 ‘outlying’	
committees	 can	 be	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 parliamentary	 party	 groups:	 Making	 use	 of	




Additionally,	 it	 can	 be	 assumed	 that	 parliamentary	 party	 groups	 are	 aware	 of	 possible	
negative	consequences	of	this	assignment	logic	and	still	maintain	other	possibilities	to	affect	





ask	 ourselves:	 What	 can	 be	 gained	 by	 abandoning	 the	 congressional	 framework	 and	 by	
providing	 a	 fresh	 perspective	 on	 non-congressional	 legislative	 parties	 and	 committee?	
Would	 the	new	 framework	 really	be	 fundamentally	different	 compared	 to	 the	 framework	
that	has	been	used	so	far	(although	sometimes	more	explicitly)	and	would	it	help	scholars	to	
understand	 the	 economy	of	 committee	 assignment	 better?	 Such	 a	 question	 is	 difficult	 to	
answer	without	knowing	the	alternative	but	what	we	know	is	that	the	deduced	rationales	
are	 not	 too	 far-fetched	when	 reviewing	 the	 literature.	 Empirical	 evidence	 points	 towards	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 rationales	deduced	 from	 the	 congressional	 theories	are	able	 to	 (in	most	
cases)	allow	us	to	understand	committee	assignments	 in	many	non-congressional	settings.	















Although	 the	 prior	 section	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 congressional	 theories	 can	 help	 at	 least	
theoretically	motivate	non-congressional	 cases,	 there	are	 several	 issues	we	want	 to	 raise.	
Scholars	using	the	congressional	theories	should	always	be	wary	about	their	origin	and	be	
specific	 about	 the	 role	 that	 legislative	 parties	 play	 in	 the	 legislature	 they	 analyse.	 Most	
studies	 focus	 on	 actual	 assignments	 but	 usually	 do	 not	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	
assignment	 phase	 itself.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 crucial	 phase	 to	 consider	 when	 providing	 a	
complete	account	on	who	gets	what	 (and	why).	 In	 this	phase	partisan	 influences	become	
visible	 (either	 in	 the	way	that	preferences	 for	committees	are	evaluated	or	not	and,	 if	 so,	
what	happens	when	there	is	a	divergence	between	wished	of	the	legislator	and	the	actual	
assignment).	 To	 provide	 more	 insight	 into	 this	 negotiation	 phase,	 we	 could	 rely	 on	
committee	request	data	(an	often	used	strategy	 in	the	US	 literature).	However,	given	that	




The	 results	of	many	 studies	outside	of	 the	US	 context	hint	 at	 the	 importance	of	 country-
specific	patterns	as	an	addition	to	the	general	framework.	The	presence	of	several	country-
specific	 factors	 is	 an	 important	 revelation	 which	 has	 implications	 for	 studies	 trying	 to	
broaden	 the	 evidence	 of	 this	 study	 towards	workings	 of	 specialised	 committees	 in	 other	
legislatures.	Although	the	eventual	goal	of	our	endeavour	to	study	parliaments	needs	to	be	
to	generalise	our	findings	on	rules	and	proceedings,	future	research	needs	to	leave	room	for	







be	 tackled.	As	was	mentioned	above,	 the	post-assignment	phase,	 i.e.	 the	 actual	 decision-
making	processes	and	the	room	for	manoeuvre	of	committee	members	are	hardly	studied	
so	far	(but	see	Damgaard	and	Mattson,	2004;	Settembri	and	Neuhold,	2009;	Mickler,	2018).	
Committee	 assignments	 are	 arguably	most	 relevant	when	 committees	 are	 empowered	 in	
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